The Effect of Deminimis Polluting in the Sixth Circuit. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Intl. Corp. by Troxell, Gary A.
Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 1 2002-2003 
Article 3 
2002 
The Effect of Deminimis Polluting in the Sixth Circuit. Kalamazoo 
River Study Group v. Rockwell Intl. Corp. 
Gary A. Troxell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary A. Troxell, The Effect of Deminimis Polluting in the Sixth Circuit. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. 
Rockwell Intl. Corp. , 10 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 11 (2002) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol10/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an 
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MELPR, Vol. 10, No. 1
CASENOTE
THE EFFECT OF DEMINIMIS POLLUTING IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Intl. Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 Congress fassed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA came about in response to several nationally publicized toxic
waste problems including Times Beach, Missouri.3 CERCLA was enacted to promptly cleanup
waste and to ensure that those responsible for the contamination paid the cleanup costs." However,
in Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., the Sixth Circuit allowed a known polluter
to escape liability, despite being found liable for a determined amount of pollution. The point of this
casenote is to argue that Congressional intent would have been better represented had the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded Kalamazoo, requiring the district court to award contribution based
on judicially determined release amounts.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Until the 1970's the synthetic liquid polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) was widely used in
many industrial processes,5 including use in capacitors and transformers, cutting, hydraulic, and
quench oils, carbonless copy paper manufacturing, and paper recycling.6 Manufacturers halted
production of PCBs in the 1970's in response to its hazardous nature, specifically the risk it imposed
to the environment and health of employees. At approximately the same time production ceased,
the State of Michigan began a study on the Kalamazoo River to determine its level of PCBs
contamination.8 Michigan completed the study in 1990 and concluded that thirty-five miles of the
river were contaminated by PCBs.9
Based on Michigan's findings, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed a portion
of the Kalamazoo River and Portage Creek (the Site) on the National Priorities list as a Superfund
Site pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605.'o The EPA then authorized Michigan to conduct an
Endangerment/Risk Assessment of the Site." Following the risk assessment, Michigan identified
Georgia Pacific Corporation, Millennium Holdings, Incorporated, and Plainwell, Incorporated, as
parties potentially responsible for the release of PCBs into the Site.u The three companies then
' 274 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2001). (Hereinafter Kalamazoo 1)
2 42 U.S.C. § 960! et seq. (2002).
Cathi M. Kraetzer, A Little Waste Goes a Long Way: The Recovery of Response Costs Under CERCLA. 66 Mo. L. Re\ 649. 641) n(2001).
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilits (F Supertund ILi
of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1. 5 (1982).
Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d at 1045.
6 Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 107 F. Supp.2d 817, 823 (W.D. Mich. 2000). (Hereinafter Kalamazoo H.





2 Id. at 1045-1046.
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entered into an agreement whereby they would fund a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study
(RI/FS) of the Site and the surrounding area.' 3
The RI/FS was to include ninety-five miles of the Kalamazoo River, including portions both
above and below the Site.14 Fort James Operating Company later agreed to join the RI/FS.' 5 These
four companies, all paper manufactures, joined together to create the Kalamazoo River Study Group
(KRSG).' By 1999 the KRSG had spent approximately three million dollars on the RI/FS." The
KRSG allocated among themselves percentage shares of the costs.'8 Allied agreed to accept a thirty-
five percent share, Georgia-Pacific thirty-five percent, Plainwell fifteen percent, and James River
fifteen percent.'
In 1995 the KRSG sued Rockwell and seven other companies for contribution to fund the
RUFS and future cleanup costs of the Site.20 This suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f). 21 Seven of the defendants settled or otherwise resolved the issue, leaving only Rockwell in
this case. 2 The district court split the bench trial into two parts. 23 The first trial determined whether
Rockwell had released PCBs into the Site.24 The second trial focused on response costs attributable
to Rockwell. 2 5 At the liability stage the district court, using a "threshold of significance standard," 26
determined that Rockwell and KRSG had both contributed sufficient PCBs into the Site to be liable
under CERCLA.2 7 After determining that Rockwell had released PCBs and was therefore liable for
a portion of the response costs, the court had to decide on what percentage to allocate to Rockwell.28
The district court determined that three factors are generally relevant when allocating
response costs: (1) the quantity of PCBs released by the party; (2) the relative toxicity of the PCBs;
and (3) the cooperation of the parties with regulatory agencies.29 The district court determined that
factors two and three did not favor either party and therefore based the decision entirely on the
quantity of PCBs.30 The district court determined in phase one of the trial that Rockwell had released
no more than twenty pounds of PCBs into the Site. ' In contrast, the court believed that KRSG
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1045-1046.
Kalama:oo Ii. 107 F. Supp.2d at 821.
Kalamazoo River StudY Group v. Mlenasha Corp.. 228 F.3d 648. 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (Hereinafter Menasha); Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d
at 1046.
Kalaazoo I. 274 F.3d at 1046.
h.
-Idhi.
The term %%as defined as imposing a requirement that a defendant's release of hazardous material is of sufficient significance tojustifi response costs. Id. at 1046. In Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Eaton Corp., 142 F. Supp.2d 831 (6th Cir. 2001), Eaton Corp.
had won summary judgment from the trial court based on the threshold test. The 6th Circuit reversed the trial courts use of the
-threshold of significance standard- in the liability phase and stated that requiring a party suing for contribution to show causation was
contrary to the central purpose of CERCLA, that is prompt cleanup of hazardous waste. CERCLA only requires a showing of
hazardous substance release not a link between the cost of cleanup and the waste generated by a particular party. Menasha, 228 F.3d
at 655-657. Causation can be a factor examined when determining contribution, but not in determining liability. Id. at 656. However,
the reversal of the standard in no wav affected the case against Rockwell. as Rockwell was found to have met the -threshold of
significance- standard it would obviously meet the new lower standard. Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d at 1046.
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members had released "hundreds of thousands of pounds" of PCBs into the Site.32 Accordingly, no
response costs were allocated to Rockwell because of its relatively miniscule release of PCBs.n
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA Introduction
In 1980. a lame duck session of Congress hurriedly put together a compromise "Superfund"
bill that had, in some form or another, been in the works for over three years. 34 CERCLA partially
came about in response to a 1979 study by the EPA which found that there were between thirty and
tiftV thousand hazardous waste sites in the United States, at least twelve hundred of which posed a
serious threat to public health.3 Congress enacted CERCLA for two main purposes: 1) to promptly
cleanup hazardous waste sites, and 2) to ensure that those responsible for the waste pay for the
cleanup.."' This second purpose is evident in the introductory language of the bill:
[t]he legislation would also establish a Federal cause of action in strict liability to
enable the Administrator to pursue rapid recovery of the costs incurred for the costs
of such actions undertaken by him from persons liable therefor and to induce such
persons Voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect
to inactive hazardous waste sites. '
Once the EPA locates a hazardous waste site, a preliminary investigation is conducted to
determine which wastes are present and if the public is in danger.3 Extremely dangerous sites are
placed on the National Priorities List (NPL)._") Once a site is on the NPL, CERCLA authorizes
cleanup in one of two ways. 0 The EPA may clean up the site itself and sue potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) for the cleanup costs," or the EPA can order PRPs to conduct the cleanup
themselves.- Prior to cleanup, a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) must be
conducted."' The RI/FS involves an examination of the site and a determination of the best method
of cleanup.4 4 If a PRP is conducting the study, the EPA will supervise. Once the RI/FS is
completed. a course of action will be determined, followed by a period of public comment.46 Upon
I'!
Grad. - ('lum.1 Envil. L. at 1.
H R. Rpt 96-1016. at IS (la\ 16. 1980) (reprinted in 1980 L.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. 6120).
Blake A. Wat'on. Ldu ral (oln-' ruction of CERC/I ( nder The Remedial Pto-pose Canon: /ave the Lower Courts Taken a Good
ThingZ Too Far", 20 liar\. Enitl. L. Rev. 99. 202-203 (1996).
H.R. Rpt. 96-1016. at 17 (ma\ 16. 1980) (reprinted n 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. 6120) (emphasis added).
Karen L Denco. L CERCL I iorking? Ai.n tnll-is oft heSeleinent and Contribution Provisions. 68 St. John's L. Rev. 493. 501
Id. at 501-502.
Id at 502. 42 I'.S.C (9604(1) (2002) states that the )'resident is authorized -to remove or arrange for the removal of' hazardous
substances. The section goes on to say that the landowner or other responsible party may be allowed to carry out the cleanup if the
President determines the part\- \ill do so "properl\ and promptl ." Id.
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closure of the comment phase the Remedial Design (RD) phase begins.47 The RD phase consists of
fine-tuning the chosen course of action. Next, the Remedial Action (RA) phase begins; it is at this
point that site cleanup begins.
Under CERCLA a party is liable for cleanup costs if it falls within one of four categories of
responsible parties. 50 If a party is otherwise liable, they can be relieved of liability if they qualify for
one of the three statutory defenses.5 Almost immediately courts began to find an implied right of
contribution for parties charged with cleanup- 2 This meant that a party, ordered by the government
to cleanup a site or pay for the cleanup, could sue other potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to
recover a percentage of the cleanup costs. 3 This type of suit is usually handled in a bifurcated
trial. 4 Phase one consists of determining the liability of the parties, while phase two is the
allocation phase where different percentages of liability are assessed.
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).'
SARA, among other things, codified the contribution rights that courts had implicitly found in
CERCLA." 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) states in part -any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).- The statute goes on to say that
"[i]n resolving contribution claims. the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." The clear text of the statutc results
in contribution allocation that is completely within the court's discretion and. as a result. can vary
greatly case to case. 9 Appellate courts are generally reluctant to overturn a district court's equitable
decision unless there is an error of law, or an abuse of discretion."o
B. Equitable Decisions
Since appellate courts review a district court's equitable decisions only for an abuse Of
discretion, it is important for parties to understand the factors the district court may rely on in
reaching its equitable decision. Many courts use the "Gore Factors" as a starting point in
determining contribution.6 ' The Gore Factors are derived from an amendment Congressman Albert
Gore proposed during the 1980 CERCLA debates.62 Although the amendment was not adopted in
47 id.
a Id.
50 Carolina L. Carver, Spreading the Costs of Environmental Cleanup: Contribution Claims I under CERCL. I and RCR1. . SE73 ALl-
ABA 333, 339 (2000). Those four categories are: (I) current owner or operator of the site: (2) owner or operator at the time that
disposal of hazardous substances took place: (3) any party which contracted to have hazardous materials disposed of at the site: and
(4) parties which transported hazardous substances to the site if they chose the site. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (2002).
Si 42 U.S.C. 9607(b) (2002). The statutory defenses are act of god, act of war, act or omission of a third party which is not the parties
agent or connected by contractual obligations. Id.
5 Carver, supra n. 50, at 339.
s Richard D. Buckley, Jr., Making a Case of Statutory Anendnen to fihe Comprehensive Environmental Response. (ominpenscuion
and Liability Act: Solving he Section 107/Section 13 Cause ofAclion Controversi, 31 Tulsa L.J. 851, 856 (1996).
s Id.
5Id.
5" Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, (1986).
5 Buckley, supra n. 53, at 857.
5842 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
s9 Carver, supra n. 50, at 340.
6 Robert P. Dahlquist, Making Sense of Superfund Allocation Decisions: The Rough Justice of Negotiated and Litigated Allocations.
31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11098, *2 (September 2001).
61 Carver, supra n. 50, at 346.
62 Id.
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the final legislation, courts have continued to use them as a framework for CERCLA liability.6 3
Congressman Gore's amendment stated:
In apportioning liability under this subparagraph, the court may consider among other
factors, the following: (i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their
contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be
distinguished; (ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved; (iii) the degree of toxicity
of the hazardous waste involved; (iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste; (v)
the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (vi)
the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or environment.
The Gore factors provide a basis for academic and theoretical analyses of CERCLA liability.
However, in practice the four factors composed by District Court Judge Ernest C. Torres are more
useful.65 Judge Torres' factors are: 1) the extent to which cleanup costs are attributable to vastes for
which a party is responsible; 2) the party's level of culpability; 3) the degree to Which the party
benefited from the disposal of the waste; and 4) the party's ability to pay its share of the cost.60 Of
course a district judge is not required to follow either approach; which is evidenced in the present
case when Judge Bell choose to analyze three factors. 7
C. What is a party liable for?
Under CERCLA a party can be found jointly and severally liable, or severally liable,
depending on the section of the statute for which the claim is based. 8 Under § 9607 a party is
jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of cleanup unless qualified for a defense listed in §
9607(b). 69 The 1986 SARA addition of§ 9613(f)(1) states that a party could seek contribution from
other PRPs adding several liability.70
In early CERCLA litigation, after the EPA had required a party to pay, that party would sue
other PRPs under § 9607, thereby establishing joint liability with them.71 However, most courts
today hold that a suit by bne PRP against another, is a contribution claim, and therefore only allow
suits to be brought under § 9613, thereby allowing only seveial liability
63 Dahlquist, supra n. 60, at *3. Some commentators question the use of the Gore Factors in light of the fact that Congress expressly
rejected them by non-adoption. "Hence. it is ironic. and probably wrong. for courts and commentators to continuall assert that the
factors should form the framework for allocating liability under CERCLA. Superfund allocation cases may be the only type of legal
proceeding where courts and parties feel compelled to follow a procedure . . . that wNas rejected by Congress. hI.
6 126 Cong. Rec. 26781 (1980).
65 Dahlquist, supra n. 60, at *34.
6 Id. at *4.
67 Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d at 1046. Listed in the text accompanying supra n. 29.
68 Carver, supra n. 50, at 339-343.
6) Id. at 339. Joint and Several liability means that an injured party *mav sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable damages
from any joint and severally liable person." Restatement of the Law Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 10 (2000).
70 Carver, supra n. 50, at 340-344. The broad equitable discretion allowed by this section could allow for joint liability, hoxwever most
courts have determined that it includes several liability only. Id. at 344.
7i Id. at 341.
72 Id. at 341-342.
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It is perhaps easiest to understand the difference with an example. Suppose that the EPA
determines, through a preliminary investigation, that land owned by XYZ is contaminated. If the
site is added to the NPL, the EPA can order XYZ to cleanup the site, or the EPA can cleanup the site
itself and sue for costs under section 9607. In either case XYZ is going to bring a § 9613 suit against
any other PRPs who might have contributed to the pollution on site.73 For ease of discussion,
assume the EPA chose to conduct the cleanup itself. The EPA would then file suit under § 9607 to
recover costs. XYZ would be jointly and severally liable; they would pay for the entire cleanup. If
XYZ joined other PRPs to the suit they could have their respective percentages determined at that
time, but could still be required to pay the full amount. If XYZ paid the entire cost of the cleanup
and now sues under § 9613 they are only entitled to receive several liability from the other PRPs;
that is, payment for the portion of pollution actually attributed to the PRPs.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine whether a party
that released PCBs into the environment could be relieved from its duty of contribution due to the
fact that it had released very little hazardous waste as compared to the plaintiffs. 74 The court first
ruled that a determination of potential liability does not preclude a court from refusing to allocate
response costs to that party. In support of its decision the court relied on PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-
Williams Co._7 where the Seventh Circuit held that a party that admitted to dumping waste could
have a zero allocation of clean up costs if its share of the pollution was inconsequential compared to
the total amount of the contamination.77 However, the Sixth Circuit warned that parties whose
release was relatively inconsequential were not always relieved of liability.7 By way of example,
the court used a scenario where all responsible parties released relatively little contamination.7 9 In
such a scenario it would not be unreasonable for the court to allocate a portion of the cleanup to each
responsible party despite their relatively small release.80 KRSG further argued that the district
court's failure to allocate response costs undermined the central purpose of CERCLA." KRSG's
argument was that CERCLA requires prompt cleanup of hazardous sites; accordingly a zero liability
decision would encourage business to fight contribution claims.82 The Sixth Circuit did not agree,
stating that a zero liability decision is a very fact specific determination and, consequently, would
not have an effect on businesses* decisions to litigate or settle.83
Next, the court ruled that the district court did not err when it determined that Rockwell's
release was inconsequential as compared to the release by the members of KRSG.84 The district
court determined that Rockwell released less than twenty pounds of PCBs.85 To reach this
determination the district court had to analyze competing expert testimony, and in the end believed
Do not forget that XYZ does not have to have contributed any pollution to the site; under section 9607 as a landowner they are
liable for cleanup.
Kalma:oo 1, 274 F.3d at 1045.
Id. at 1049.
151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).







s Al. at 1051.
Id. at 1049.
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the expert for Rockwell. 8 6 The Sixth Circuit, after analyzing some of the experts conflicting
opinions, held that the district court's decision was not clearly erroneous.87
Finally, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court did not err when deciding that the
relative toxicity of the parties' release and their cooperation with regulatory authorities did not favor
either party." The court of appeals first analyzed the district court's decision that the toxicity of
release did not favor either party. Rockwell principally released PCBs called Aroclor 1254, while
KRSG members primarily released Aroclor 1242.90 KRSG argued that the EPA considers Aroclor
1254 more toxic than Aroclor 1242, because of this the district court was wrong in treating their
toxicity the same. The Sixth Circuit however pointed to the evidence that provided a reasonable
basis for the district court's decision.92 Specifically the court pointed out that Michigan does not
specify which chemical is involved when it issues fish advisories or other regulatory criteria.93 The
Sixth Circuit acknowledged that KRSG presented enough evidence to show that Aroclor 1254 is
more toxic than Aroclor 1242, however it was not left with a "definite and firm conviction" that the
district court erred in following the approach advocated by Michigan.9 4 Furthermore, in light of the
difference in release amounts, even the increased toxicity of Aroclor 1254 would not likely have
altered the allocation of response costs.9 5
The appellate court next analyzed KRSG's argument that Rockwell was less cooperative than
KRSG and therefore the district court erred in determining that this factor favored neither side.
However, KRSG offered no rebuttal to the district courts determination that neither side fully
cooperated, and therefore neither side was entitled to the factor in their favor.97
In his concurring opinion Judge Jones expressed his reservations about the current state of
CERCLA contribution." According to Judge Jones the central purpose of CERCLA was to ensure
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that those responsible pay the cost of
cleanup."" In the current case a known polluter, Rockwell, had to pay nothing because its release
was minimal compared to the other polluters.1 0o This, he believed, is contrary to § 9607(a), which
requires strict liability for any release.1ot Judge Jones acknowledged that although Congress
authorized equitable judicial discretion in § 9613. the legislative history and the principles of equity
demand that response costs be apportioned among all polluters no matter how large or small their
individual percentages.' 112 However, Judge Jones concurred in the judgment because of his belief
that discretion should reside with the district court."()3
Id at Info





/d. at I Oil
Id. at 105-1 053 (Jones. J.. concurrinn).
i. at 152 IJones. J.. concurring).
/d/ at 1053 iJones. J.. concurring).
hi
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V. COMMENT
Judge Jones, in his concurring opinion, expressed his concern that a PRP determined.by the
district court to be a polluter was relieved of liability because it polluted less than other.PRPs.1
"Rockwell, a known polluter, has been allowed to escape response costs on the grounds that its PCB
release was sufficiently 'inconsequential' to remove the justification for allocation of costs.-" '
CERCLA was passed with the express purpose of promoting prompt cleanup with those responsible
paying for the cleanup.' 0 6 However, the district court's decision in this case violates this express
purpose.
The district court, while statutorily authorized to utilize its equitable powers in splitting up
response costs, allowed a proven polluter to walk away without paying its fair percentage. Since
Rockwell paid nothing, KRSG members must pay more than their fair percentage. CERCLA
imposes strict liability for any environmental release.107 CERCLA also states that courts may utilize
the equitable factors they deem appropriate in allocating response costs. 'l These two sections
appear to be in conflict. However, they would not be in conflict, if courts interpreted § 961 3(f) to
hold that the contribution amount, but not whether to award, was governed by equitable decisions.
In the bifurcated trial the district court determined that Rockwell was a polluter.'0 0 In the trial's
second phase the district court, using its equitable power, decided not to award response costs. I
The most effective way to insure that Congress' goal of prompt environmental cleanup.
holding those responsible for the contamination liable for the cost of the cleanup, is to hold all
polluters liable regardless as to how little they have polluted.''' Even though the district court
determined that Rockwell released only twenty pounds of PCBs,112 out of an estimated three
hundred and fifty thousand pounds of pollution in the Site,''1 it should have been ordered to pay its
percentage of the cleanup. Though that percentage is very small, Rockwell polluted and should pay.
Judge Jones stated that he was voting to affirm, not necessarily because he agreed with the
district court, but because he felt that discretion should reside with the district court. 1 14 The easiest
solution to Judge Jones' concerns, however, would be to reverse the district court and order it to
enforce the percentages it determined were appropriate in phase one of the trial. If appellate courts
refuse to do this, Congressional action to amend CERCLA might be necessary to punish polluters
such as Rockwell. Even though Rockwell's percentage of the cleanup might be very small. by
enforcing the percentage found to be attributable to them the district court would be making a
decision in harmony with the Congressional intent underlying CERCLA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International Corporation a known polluter
escaped liability because a district court used its equitable discretion to decide that it was not fair to
104 Id.
1os Id.
'0 H.R. Rpt. 96-1016, at 17 (May 16, 1980) (reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).
107 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
'
08 Id. at § 9613(f)(1).
10 Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d at 1046.
"o Id. at 1046-1047.
11 Kraetzer, supra n. 3, at *7.
'12 Kalamazoo 1, 274 F.3d at 1047.
" Kalamazoo II, 107 F. Supp.2d at 820.
'"' Kalamazoo I, 274 F.3d at 1053 (Jones, J., concurring).
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force Rockwell to pay for the pollution it caused because it was sufficiently "inconsequential." This
holding sends the wrong message to polluters. Polluters should know that they will pay for their
contamination no matter how small.
GARY A. TROXELL
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